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Introduction 
Observers of Greek events during the early 1990s were struck by the extent to which 
nationalism dominated the domestic political discourse and dictated foreign policy 
options. To most, on account of a highly sentimental approach to a seemingly 
parochial issue, Greece failed to act as one of the ‘Western Club’ of states and 
forfeited a rare opportunity to enhance its international standing. Greek foreign policy 
during the Macedonian controversy resulted from the interplay of external and 
domestic pressures, the latter being conditioned by the workings of the political 
system and its culture. Political leaders encouraged popular mobilisation only to end 
up hostages to their own maximalist rhetoric. But the impressive display of public 
sentiment cannot simply be attributed to a ‘top-down’ effect. It was also the work of 
private individuals, associations and institutions which brought pressure to bear upon 
decision-makers. Their potential role was amplified by the burgeoning, private-owned 
electronic media. After three years or so, this campaign died down before a 
compromise was finally struck under foreign pressure. 
Far from being an unprecedented phenomenon, the events of the early 1990s seem to 
fit in with a long-standing Greek tradition of conflating domestic issues and foreign 
affairs. This tradition is nearly as old as the Greek state itself.1 This study focuses on 
the role of domestic factors, which are broadly defined as ‘interest’ or ‘pressure’ 
groups, in Greek foreign policy from the end of World War II to the breakdown of 
representative government in 1967. A number of hypotheses stem from this approach: 
group activity did not express a developed civil society, which hardly existed in 
Greece; rather, it originated with institutions and groups intimately connected with the 
state through practices of patronage or outright control; it was embedded in a political 
culture that little corresponded to the values of a modern democratic state and civil 
society; such activity tended to develop a momentum of its own that raised the stakes 
for policy-makers and ultimately undermined the prospects of success. A brief 
overview of the German and Israeli experience may also help to test the above 
hypotheses in a comparative perspective. Before turning to the Greek context and the 
three historical precedents presented here, a number of key analytical concepts ought 
                                                 
1. See, for instance, Yorgos Yannoulopoulos, Η ευγενής µας τύφλωσις. Εξωτερική πολιτική και «εθνικά 
θέµατα» από την ήττα του 1897 έως τη Μικρασιατική Καταστροφή, Βιβλιόραµα, 1999. 
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to be explained. The importance of domestic factors in foreign policy-making and the 
sense in which terms such as ‘pressure groups’ and ‘political culture’ are used here 
are not necessarily self-evident. 
 
 
Foreign Policy and Domestic Factors 
There can be little doubt today, at least among historians, that in explaining the 
behaviour of states on the international scene domestic politics may only be ignored at 
the analyst’s peril. Even if the external context is taken as a starting point, an enquiry 
into the causes of foreign policy behaviour is simply bound to come across the actors’ 
domestic considerations. Then it is a matter of considered judgement to determine 
how the interplay of internal and external factors shaped the specific outcome.2 
The influence of domestic factors on foreign policy is, of course, conditioned by the 
political system and its mode of operation. In the case of modern liberal democracies, 
foreign policy and internal politics often appear closely interwoven with a 
considerable potential for generating domestic dissent. As it has been aptly observed, 
at the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favorable policies, and politicians seek power by 
constructing coalitions among those groups. At the international level, national 
governments seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, 
while minimizing the adverse consequences of foreign developments. Neither 
of the two games can be ignored by central decision makers.3 
‘Interest’ seems a central concept. For political actors, such as the government and 
political parties, it means maximizing their ability to retain office. In the case of non-
                                                 
2. The debate is still alive in the field of International Relations. For a ‘state of the art’ account, see 
Harald Müller and Thomas Risse-Kappen, ‘From the Outside In and from the Inside Out: International 
Relations, Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy’, in David Skidmore and Valerie M. Hudson (eds.), 
The Limits of State Autonomy: Societal Groups and Foreign Policy Formulation, Westview Press, 
1993. 
3. Robert D. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games’, 
International Organization, 43:3 (Summer, 1988), p. 434. See also, Helen V. Milner, Interest, 
Institutions and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations, Princeton University 
Press, 1997, p. 5. 
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state or social actors, their basic interest is to maximize their particular values.4 Such 
values may not be entirely divorced from material ends, although they often appear to 
be so. Ideological motives alone can hardly be relied upon to sustain the joint effort of 
a sizeable group of people for any length of time.5 The pursuit of political and 
economic benefits is often couched in terms of religious beliefs, ideological goals or 
cultural demands by social actors who act as interest groups. 
There are as many definitions of interest groups – or pressure groups, as they are 
interchangeably called – as there are studies of this phenomenon in the fields of 
economics, political science and sociology.6 Here the term is used to describe 
associations of individuals or even institutions, which attempt to influence public 
policy.7 Spontaneous and usually ephemeral social expressions of a common cause, 
such as demonstrations or riots, may not be relevant to this analysis unless they result 
in more organised and lasting attempts to influence state policy. Interest groups 
should also be distinguished from political parties. It is assumed that interest groups 
do not aim at coming to power but rather seek to influence those in office.8 
The relationship between the state and interest groups is often mediated by 
bureaucracies and/or clientelistic networks. Affinities in background, professional 
skills and experiences encourage private ‘interested’ parties to seek access to like-
minded members of the state apparatus.9 What ultimately counts is access to policy-
makers.10 This may be effected through networks of patronage. These are based on a 
                                                 
4. Milner, 33; Frank R. Baumgartner and Beth L. Leech, Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in 
Politics and in Political Science, Princeton University Press, 1998, pp. 24-25. 
5. Mancur Olson, ‘The Logic of Collective Action’, in Jeremy J. Richardson (ed.), Pressure Groups, 
Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 30-31. 
6. A glimpse of  the diversity of definitions may be obtained from Baumgartner and Leech, pp. 25-30. 
7. This is the definition given by Clive S. Thomas and Ronald J. Hrebenar; see Clive S. Thomas, 
‘Studying the Political Party - Interest Group Relationship’, in idem (ed.), Political Parties and Interest 
Groups: Shaping Democratic Governance, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp. 7-8. See also Jeremy J. 
Richardson, ‘Pressure Groups and Government’ in idem. (ed.), Pressure Groups, Oxford University 
Press, 1993, p. 1; Robert Salisbury, ‘Interest Representation: The Dominance of Institutions’, American 
Political Science Review, 78:1 (March, 1984), 64. 
8. Milner, pp. 35, 60-65; Thomas, pp. 9-11, 18, 22. 
9. W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers: Mass Opinion, Interest Groups, 
and Élites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy, Octagon Books, 1973, pp. 93-96. 
10. Thomas, pp. 271, 282, 286. 
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reciprocal personal relation of trust between voter and patron which undermine 
corporate loyalty and blurs the line between individual and public interest.11 
In Western polities interest groups usually wield their influence in areas of domestic 
policy. Purely ‘high politics’ concerning the aims and conduct of foreign policy are 
normally the prerogative of government.12 At the same time, ruling élites are 
constantly engaged in a process of gaining and maintaining legitimacy. Whereas they 
enjoy important advantages in the policy-making process vis-à-vis other domestic 
players, they are ultimately accountable to the electorate. Their choices in foreign 
affairs may affect the material interests of citizens or provoke ideological conflict 
over values and goals.13 Thus, political legitimation offers interest groups a chance to 
interfere in the policy-making process. 
Foreign policy decisions are often legitimised as serving the ‘national interest’. This 
concept – always a matter of interpretation – generally reflects a society’s political 
culture.14 References to a nation’s ‘mission’ or its role in world affairs are prominent 
in most politicians’ rhetoric. Such cultural beliefs are normally internalised as self-
evident by the majority of citizens.15 Political culture is understood here as a 
historically formed set of values, beliefs as well as attitudes according to which a 
political system functions.16 It should be distinguished from ideology which is a ‘self-
contained’ system of concepts through which social reality is interpreted and 
occasionally transformed. Ideologies as well as traditional modes of thought, such as 
myths and religious beliefs, usually co-exist within the same culture.17 
                                                 
11. George Th. Mavrogordatos, Οµάδες πίεσης και δηµοκρατία, Πατάκης, 2000, p. 238. 31; idem, 
Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936, University of 
California Press, 1983, pp. 5-14. 
12. Müller and Risse-Kappen, p. 39. 
13. Christopher Hill, ‘Public Opinion and British Foreign Policy since, 1945: Research in Progress?’, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10:1 (Spring, 1981), 59; Valerie M. Hudson, Susan M. 
Sims and John C. Thomas, ‘The Domestic Political Context of Foreign Policy and Making’, in 
Skidmore and Hudson (eds.), pp. 53 and 54; Milner, 12, 16, 18; Skidmore and Hudson, p. 4-6, 10. 
14. Skidmore and Hudson, p. 7. ‘National interest’ is used here to the extent that foreign policy-makers 
and their critics resort to this concept. It does not imply any preference for the Realist paradigm in 
international relations. 
15. Hill, p. 56; Valerie M. Hudson, ‘Culture and Foreign Policy: Developing a Research Agenda’, in 
idem (ed.), Culture and Foreign Policy, Lynne Rienner, 1997, p. 13. 
16. A number of definitions of culture see in Hudson, ‘Culture and Foreign Policy’, p. 3. 
17. Hudson, pp. 6 and 9. pp. 23-26. 
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The impact of domestic constituencies on foreign policy agendas is sometimes 
publicly admitted. Politicians and political analysts often claim that public opinion 
will or will not stand a certain policy. Thus, one final concept demands clarification. 
Public opinion has been defined as the aggregate of many different and competing 
attitudes, and opinion as expressed through the press, parties and pressure groups. Its 
analytical value is limited, however, as ‘public opinion’ can be easily shown to be 
riddled with divisions and inconsistencies, and also extremely susceptible to 
manipulation in political argument. It has aptly been described a ‘political totem’, a 
mere legitimising device. If deconstructed into its cultural components, it may help to 
illustrate the workings of political culture within the body politic.18 
 
Greek Political Culture 
Certain elements of Greek political culture in the early post-war decades appear 
relevant to this analysis: nationalism and its transformation under the impact of the 
Civil War, Christian Orthodoxy, and an ambivalence about the modern state and its 
institutions. It is argued that the dominant culture not only discouraged rational 
decision-making, but it also served little the consolidation of a liberal democratic 
regime and an open society. 
Greek cultural identity was shaped by a centralised and effective education system 
which cultivated an excessive reliance on the Past in the form of an ancestors’ cult 
(progonolatreia).19 As a result, the classical legacy came to be regarded as the 
exclusive patrimony of modern Greeks. This assumption fed a sense of pride which 
uneasily coexisted with an inferiority complex vis-à-vis the ‘advanced West’.20 Not 
unrelated was the distinction between culturally ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ peoples, in 
which Greek education long indulged. Ethnocentrism, chauvinism, and racial 
                                                 
18. See the incisive analysis by Christopher Hill, op. cit. 
19. John Campbell and Philip Sherrard, Modern Greece, Frederick Praeger, 1968, pp. 384-5. This study 
records the conformism and other shortcomings of Greek education before the short-lived reforms of 
1964. 
20. As Thanos Lipowatz has observed, even today Greek attitude appears to oscillate between a feeling 
of inferiority and impotence and an attitude of arrogance and superiority. Lipowatz, Ζητήµατα πολιτικής 
ψυχολογίας, Εξάντας, 1991, p. 276. See also, Konstantinos Tsoukalas, «Ιστορία, µύθοι και χρησµοί: Η 
αφήγηση της ελληνικής συνέχειας», in Venetia Apostolidou et al, Έθνος - Κράτος - Εθνικισµός, 
Εταιρεία Σπουδών Νεοελληνικού Πολιτισµού και Γενικής Παιδείας, 1995, pp. 297-303. 
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determinism survived the tribulations of the first half of the twentieth century and 
would come to the fore in moments of popular mobilisation on foreign policy issues.21 
Nationalism, of the ethnic, irredentist type, has dominated the political discourse in 
Greece since independence. For nearly a century, it was encapsulated in the Megali 
Idea, the irredentist dream of uniting all Greeks within a resurrected Eastern Empire. 
Its dissemination within and without the national territory became the task of state 
mechanisms, the education system in particular. The University of Athens, the first 
institution of higher education in the Near East, played a central role as a hotbed of 
nationalist ideology. During the 19th and early 20th centuries, academics joined 
irredentist societies together with military officers, lawyers and clerics, often 
themselves graduates of the same institution.22 By projecting irredentist objectives as 
the ‘inextirpable rights’ of the nation, these élites fed a tradition of treating matters of 
foreign policy as issues of national survival (ethnika themata).23 
The Asia Minor catastrophe was a traumatic event that shook earlier convictions. 
Intellectual élites were left to face ‘an ideological void’ during the interwar years. Yet, 
by the end of this period, the majority of Greek intellectuals seemed to take refuge in 
a sort of defensive, xenophobic nationalism. centred around the much debated concept 
of ‘hellenicity’ or Greekness.24 Self-delusions about the civilising mission of 
Hellenism fed the vision of a ‘Third Hellenic Civilisation’, the grand design of the 
Metaxas regime.25 Mass education was never disassociated from its irredentist legacy. 
                                                 
21. Georgios Varouxakis, ‘A Certain Idea of Greece: Perceptions of the Past and European 
Integration’, Synthesis, 2:1 (1997), 34-5, 39. See also, Panos Kazakos, «Απόδηµος ελληνισµός και 
εθνικά θέµατα», Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήµης, 3 (April, 1994), pp. 106-7; Lipowatz, pp. 
238-265. 
22. Paschalis M. Kitromilides, ‘ “Imagined Communities” and the Origins of the National Question in 
the Balkans’, in Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis, Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality, 
SAGE-ELIAMEP, 1990, pp. 23 ff.; idem, ‘Greek Irredentism in Asia Minor and Cyprus’, Middle 
Eastern Studies, 26:1 (1990), pp. 3-17. 
23. As Yannoulopoulos observed, ‘the so-called “national issues” ... precisely when they are defined as 
such and not as problems of foreign policy and defence, then they do not “unfortunately end up” but 
are by definition issues of primarily domestic policy directly related to gaining or retaining political 
power’. Yannoulopoulos, Η ευγενής µας τύφλωσις, p. 56. See also Nikiforos Diamandouros, 
Πολιτισµικός δυϊσµός και πολιτική αλλαγή στην Ελλάδα της µεταπολίτευσης: Πλαίσιο ερµηνείας, 
Αλεξάνδρεια, 2000 (first published as Nikiforos P. Diamandouros., Cultural Dualism and Political 
Change in Post-authoritarian Greece, Estudio/Working Paper, 1994/50, Madrid, Centro de Estudios 
Avanzados en Ciencias Sociales, Instituto Juan March de Estudios e Investigaciones, 1984, pp. 54-5. 
24. Lipowatz, p. 279. On the intellectual debate during the interwar years, see Dimitris Tziovas, Οι 
µεταµορφώσεις του εθνισµού και το ιδεολόγηµα της ελληνικόττητας στο µεσοπόλεµο, Οδυσσέας, 1989. 
25. During the Metaxas regime, if not earlier, leading Greek intellectuals embraced a determinist 
interpretation of Ancient Greek cultural superiority owing to ‘the biological composition of the race 
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On the eve of World War II, young pupils were instructed that they, contemporary 
Greeks, ‘could never forget the glory and grandeur of the Greek Empire and do not 
cease to believe that one day the dreams of the race will be fulfillment, namely, what 
is usually called Megali Idea’.26 
As a result, successive generations of Greeks were imbued with a highly romantic 
version of nationalism which, in the aftermath of World War II, seemed out of touch 
with international realities.27 It was shared by both those who were politically 
radicalised during the war and occupation and the post-war upward mobile social 
strata. As a successful civil engineer put it during the Cyprus campaign of the 1950s, 
he supported Enosis 
because all of us Greeks have been nourished with the feats of our ancestors 
that were totally unrelated to logic, and because the present generation in 
charge of the fortunes of the Nation has seen miracles taking place in disregard 
of numbers and logic (the Straits naval battle, the Greek-Italian war), and, 
moreover, because all of us Greeks are convinced that Liberty is never 
recovered without sacrifices and perils for the entire Nation ... 28 
The protracted and bloody civil war that ensued gave Greek nationalist ideology a 
new twist. Ethnikophrosyne or ‘national-mindedness’ was even more defensive and 
introvert than interwar nationalism, reflecting the sense of mortal danger that the 
dominant political élites had just experienced. It was premised on the existence of an 
                                                                                                                                            
and the peculiar character of the place’ (I.M. Panagiotopoulos). Stratis Myrivilis, a liberal author who 
once entertained left-wing sympathies, wrote of the need for contemporary Greeks to ‘cultivate our 
Greekness as a synthetic virtue of our racial personality’. In the early post-war years, the author and 
literary critic Spyros Melas preached that ‘imitation is completely out of the spirit of the race’ and 
demanded a genuine national art ‘absolutely indigenous, steadfastly rooted in our national soil’. All 
quotations from Tziovas, pp. 145-6, 154. See also the reference to the ‘great historical mission’ of 
Greece in the, admittedly more moderate, founding declaration of the National Society of Greek 
Writers, dated June, 1948, in Nikos Alivizatos, « “Έθνος” κατά “Λαού” µετά το, 1940», in D. G. 
Tsaoussis (ed.), Ελληνισµός - ελληνικότητα: Ιδεολογικοί και βιωµατικοί άξονες της νεοελληνικής 
κοινωνίας, Βιβλιοπωλείον της «Εστίας», 1983, pp. 85-86, note 10. 
26. Anastasios Lazarou, Greek History (for the Fourth Grade of secondary education), Organisation for 
School Books Publication, Athens, 1940, quoted in Terlexis, p. 429, note 46. In, 1964-5, Terlexis 
conducted an inquiry among hundreds of Athenians, primarily university students, which showed that a 
vast majority still considered the Megali Idea a ‘desired task’ and a plurality a ‘feasible task’. 
27. As Campbell and Sherrard observed, ‘unilateral instruction based on authority and emotion will 
continue to impress on young Greek boys and girls habits of thought which subsequently in adult life 
make it very difficult for them to retreat openly from any intellectual position even when they have 
ceased to believe in it’. Campbell and Sherrard, p. 389. See also Pantazis Terlexis, ∆ιπλωµατία και 
πολιτική του Κυπριακού: Ανατοµία ενός λάθους, 2nd edition, Εκδόσεις Ράππα, 1971, pp. 38, 421ff. 
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‘internal enemy’, communism, serving the designs of the ‘ancestral foes of the race’. 
It was fully embraced by the parties of the Right, the throne and the military, although 
Centre politicians also appeared to subscribe to it. Ethnikophrosyne offered the 
ideological platform which sustained the security apparatus of the civil war well into 
the 1960s. It also helped to condemn the Left to quasi-permanent exclusion from 
mainstream politics.29 The revival of irredentism, however, on account of Cyprus 
would gravely test its assumptions about the source of threat facing the nation. 
Ethnikophrosyne also placed a premium on Christian values as an antidote to the 
blandishments of atheist communism. Christian Orthodoxy was a living tradition 
stretching several centuries in the past and had been the main source of collective 
identity before the advent of nationalism. After independence, this tradition was 
effectively adapted to the needs of building a national identity through the spurious 
construct of ‘Hellenochristianismos’.30 According to Nikiforos Diamandouros, the 
Orthodox Church reinforced authoritarian elements in the Greek culture by 
encouraging ‘resignation, fatalism, and similar non-rational attitudes towards life’.31 
Its anti-Catholic and, ultimately, anti-Western tradition is also regarded to have 
contributed to the defensive and xenophobic character of Greek nationalism thus 
undermining the prospects of political modernisation.32 
Attachment to pre-modern traditions and defensive, xenophobic nationalism are 
attributes of what Diamandouros describes as ‘underdog’ mentality. He perceives two 
antagonistic trends in Greek political culture: one indigenous, introvert, xenophobic 
and traditional; and another Western orientated, modernising and extravert, which he 
                                                                                                                                            
28. Dragoumis Papers, file 113.3, doc. 140, I. M. Papaioannou to Dragoumis, Athens, 6 March 1957. 
29. Alivizatos, 87-90; Diamandouros, ‘Greek Political Culture in Transition: Historical Origins, 
Evolution, Current Trends’, in Richard Clogg (ed.), Greece in the, 1980s, Macmillan, 1983, pp. 52-3; 
K. Tsoukalas, «Η ιδεολογική επίδραση του Εµφυλίου Πολέµου», in John O. Iatrides, Η Ελλάδα στη 
δεκαετία, 1940-1950: Ένα έθνος σε κρίση, Θεµέλιο, 1984, p. 571-5; Dimitris Dimitrakos, «Η ιδεολογία 
των κοµµάτων στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα», in Georgios Kontogiorgis (ed.), Κοινωνικές και πολιτικές 
δυνάµεις στην Ελλάδα, Εξάντας, 1977, pp. 232-4. On the emergency regime of the civil war and its 
extension after, 1949, Alivizatos, Οι πολιτικοί θεσµοί σε κρίση,, 1922-1974: Όψεις της ελληνικής 
εµπειρίας, Θεµέλιο, 1983, pp. 458 ff., particularly 474-479, 591-600. 
30. Kitromilides, ‘ “Imagined Communities” and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans’, 
pp. 51ff. 
31. Diamandouros, ‘Greek Political Culture in Transition’, pp. 57-8. 
32. Lipowatz, «Ορθόδοξος χριστιανισµός και εθνικισµός: ∆ύο πτυχές της σύγχρονης ελληνικής 
πολιτικής κουλτούρας», Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήµης, 2 (October, 1993), pp. 31-47. For 
a critique of Lipowatz’s views, see Elizabeth Prodromou, «Ορθοδοξία, εθνικισµός και πολιτική 
κουλτούρα στη σύγχρονη Ελλάδα: Καινούριες προσεγγίσεις ή εσωτερικοποίηση δεδοµένων 
παραδειγµάτων;», Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήµης, 2 (April, 1995), pp. 101-132. 
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describes as ‘underdog’ and ‘reformist’ respectively.33 According to Diamandouros, it 
is the ‘underdog’ culture that has dominated Greek politics since independence. This 
aspect of Greek political culture cuts across political divisions and manifests itself in a 
variety of ways: a predilection for conspiracy theories; extreme nationalistic reflexes; 
a manichean casting of foreigners as ‘philhellenes’ and ‘anthellenes’; an inferiority-
superiority syndrome vis-à-vis other nations; and ‘a clear tendency to identify with 
groups or persons ... which are thought of as victims of Western injustice’.34 
 
Clientelism, Political Parties and Interest Representation 
Then, one is entitled to ask oneself what became of the modernising trends in Greek 
politics? Political élites, including the Diaspora intellectuals who fathered Greek 
nationalism, politicians and administrators from the time of Count Capodistria made 
serious attempts to modernise state and society.35 The Greek state has enjoyed long 
periods of parliamentary politics, longer than many countries of Western Europe. It 
seems, however, that the social and economic forces with a stake to modernisation 
were inadequate to the task. Greece eventually lost its Diaspora bourgeoisie without 
ever acquiring its indigenous equivalent. No civil society emerged as a buffer between 
citizen and state authority. There were no effective forms of interest representation, 
independent of state control and party patronage, which could gain access to the 
centres of political power. In a sense, the traditionalist and conservative elements 
succeeded in subverting institutions and practices in a way that the latter, while 
retaining the formal trappings of modernity, actually bred the reproduction of 
traditional mentalities and behaviour.36 
                                                 
33. Diamandouros, Πολιτισµικός δυϊσµός και πολιτική αλλαγή; see also his earlier ‘Greek Political 
Culture in Transition’, pp. 43-69. 
34. Diamandouros, Πολιτισµικός δυϊσµός και πολιτική αλλαγή, p. 49. 
35. On their abortive attempt to have Enlightenment ideas introduced in the political culture of modern 
Greece, see Kitromilides, Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy: Studies in the Culture and Political 
Thought of South-eastern Europe, Aldershote-Variorum, 1994, chapter I. 
36. Demertzis, «Εισαγωγή στην ελληνική πολιτική κουλτούρα: Θεωρητικά και ερευνητικά ζητήµατα», 
p. 27; Diamandouros, ‘Greek Political Culture in Transition’, pp. 58-60; K. Tsoukalas, Κοινωνική 
ανάπτυξη και κράτος: Η συγκρότηση του δηµόσιου χώρου στην Ελλάδα, 2nd edition, Θεµέλιο, 1983, pp. 
282-289, 310; idem, ‘Free Riders in Wonderland; in Dimitri Constas - Theophanis G. Stavrou (eds.), 
Greece Prepares for the Twenty-First Century, The Woodrow Wilson Center - The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995, pp. 196-9; Nikolaos Ventouris, «Μορφολογικές πτυχές της νεοελληνικής 
πολιτικής κουλτούρας», in Evangelos Arabatzis et al., Ο φιλελευθερισµός στην Ελλάδα: Φιλελεύθερη 
θεωρία και πρακτική στην πολιτική και στην κοινωνία της Ελλάδος, Βιβλιοπωλείον της «Εστίας», 1991, 
p. 200. Mouzelis refers to formalism as a facet of political and cultural ‘underdevelopment’ which 
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In post-war Greece, whatever elements of civil society survived felt the stifling impact 
of clientelism and the illiberal practices of the state. Patronage and personal 
relationships served to keep interest representation under control. There were no 
organised party mechanisms through which social and political forces could channel 
their views and pursue their interests. Political activity as such was suspect for large 
sections of the population. With the exception of the communist Left, represented by 
the United Democratic Left (EDA), parties were little more an array of personalities, 
usually under charismatic leadership and dependent on networks of patronage.37 
During the period under consideration, the Greek state did not exactly correspond to 
the democratic model then prevailing among Western nation-states. 38 Using the 
emergency apparatus of the civil war period, Greek governments felt few qualms 
about intervening interest politics, the labour movement, in particular. State control 
aimed at neutralising leftist influence and securing social peace. Its highest organ, the 
General Confederation of Greek Workers (GSEE), was reduced to a state-funded 
bureaucracy, mostly made up of low density, ‘rubber stamp’ unions.39 ‘Dissident’ 
unions free of government control were left in the wilderness. The weakness of Greek 
trade unionism was also due to the absence of a working class in the proper sense. 
This was attributed to the country’s poor industrial development.40 With the exception 
                                                                                                                                            
prevents real issues from entering the political discourse: Nikos Mouzelis, Νεοελληνική κοινωνία: 
Όψεις υπανάπτυξης, Εξάντας, 1978, pp. 303-330. Veremis stresses the importance of the early 
introduction of universal manhood suffrage in restoring the influence of ‘traditional’ indigenous élites: 
«Κράτος και Έθνος στην Ελλάδα, 1821-1912», in D. G. Tsaoussis, Ελληνισµός – ελληνικότητα, pp. 
59ff. The role of a formalistic ‘hellenocentric’ education is noted in Varouxakis, p. 35 and note 41. 
37. Nikos Georgarakis, «Κόµµατα και δηµοκρατία στη µεταδικτατορική Ελλάδα: Προϋποθέσεις 
ενσωµάτωσης και νοµιµοποίησης», in Nikos Demertzis (ed.), Η ελληνική πολιτική κουλτούρα σήµερα, 
Οδυσσέας, 1994, pp. 261-2, 264. 
38. According to the regime typology proposed by Juan Linz, a system can be regarded as democratic 
‘when it allows the free formulation of political preferences, through the use of basic freedoms of 
association, information and communication’ for the purposes of the contest of political power ‘without 
excluding any effective political office from that competition or prohibiting any members of the 
political community from expressing their preference’. Quoted in Richard Gunther, P. Nikiforos 
Diamantouros and Hans-Jürgen Puhle (eds.), The Politics of Democratic Consolidation: Southern 
Europe in Comparative Perspective, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995, pp. 5-6. 
39. Jean Meynaud, Πολιτικές δυνάµεις στην Ελλάδα, 2nd edition, Μπάϋρον, 1974, pp. 181-7; Serafeim 
Seferiadis, «∆ιεκδικητικό κίνηµα και πολιτική: Ο ελληνικός συνδικαλισµός πριν από τη δικτατορία, 
1962-1967», Ελληνική Επιθεώρηση Πολιτικής Επιστήµης, 12 (Nov. 1998), pp. 12-13; Giorgos F. 
Koukoules, Ελληνικά συνδικάτα: Οικονοµική αυτονοµία και εξάρτηση, 1938-1984, Οδυσσέας, 1984; 
idem, Το εργατικό κίνηµα και ο µύθος του Σίσυφου, 1964-1966, Οδυσσέας, 2000. 
40. Statistics amply illustrate the Greek petit bourgeois social landscape. In 1961 nearly one third of the 
workforce were self-employed and another 30% were assisting family members; only 34,5% were 
salaried employees. See Mavrogordatos, Οµάδες πίεσης και δηµοκρατία, p. 39; idem, Μεταξύ 
Πιτυοκάµπτη και Προκρούστη: Οι επαγγελµατικές οργανώσεις στη σηµερινή Ελλάδα, second edition, 
Οδυσσέας, 1998, p. 136. 
 16
Interest Groups and Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-67 
of builders, state employees in public utility enterprises, education and banks made up 
the majority of organised work force.41 
With a labour movement effectively under government control, employers’ 
associations could not possibly present a problem. The professions remain a field little 
researched. Lawyers, medical doctors, accountants, civil engineers and technicians 
were among the beneficiaries of the economic upsurge of the 1950s and 1960s. Some 
of these groups traditionally enjoyed considerable social status. They were 
represented by high density, interest conscious but politically accommodating 
associations. One has also to consider a host of non-professional interest groups, such 
as refugee and irredentist, regional and cultural, veteran and war victims associations, 
and the student movement.42 All these groups invariably proved ready to jump on the 
bandwagon of a good nationalist cause. 
As has been noted, institutions may act as pressure groups. In Greece they did so on 
account of foreign policy issues. In the case of the Orthodox Church, it is important to 
note that its separation from the State still appears as a rather unthinkable proposition. 
Since its establishment in 1833, the Church of Greece remains a state institution, ‘a 
sui generis public service’. In a sense, it is a relationship that often conflates the 
public with the ecclesiastic domain. It is also a ‘special relationship’, in so far 
Orthodoxy represents a tremendous symbolic capital subscribed to by the vast 
majority of the population; and this is something that no government may easily 
ignore. Basking in its role as ‘national institution’, the Church often claimed a say in 
the country’s foreign affairs.43 
 
Foreign Policy-making in Post-war Greece 
In parliamentary regimes, foreign policy-making belongs to the executive branch. 
According to the Constitution of 1952, executive authority rested with the King but it 
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was exercised by the responsible government and no royal act was valid unless signed 
by a minister. The offices involved in foreign policy-making were primarily that of 
the Prime Minister seconded by the Foreign Minister, the National Defence Minister, 
and the Co-ordination Minister. Charismatic leaders heading single party 
governments, such as Constantine Karamanlis, tended to treat foreign policy as their 
personal domain. In matters with serious domestic repercussions, such as Cyprus, they 
preferred to rely on their small circle of aides rather than on the competent 
bureaucracy of the Foreign Office. This tendency severely reduced the role of the 
diplomatic service as an institutional group in the policy-making process.44 
Still, ‘the hegemonic role of the executive’ in foreign policy issues was far from 
unfettered. Despite the letter of the Constitution, the Palace, that is the King, the 
Queen, and their entourage, maintained a deep personal interest in foreign affairs. The 
military, partly as a result of its role in the civil war, perceived a mission in the 
protection of both the prevailing social order and the country’s allegiance to the 
Western alliance. The so-called ‘allied factor’, primarily the United States 
government and its diplomatic representatives in Greece, maintained a steady 
influence on the foreign policy-making of successive Greek cabinets. No government 
could ignore these three potent factors without risking its own stability. 
Democratically elected governments normally need to consider public reactions to 
their policies as expressed through representative institutions, the press or civil 
society. In the case of post-war Greece, the role of the parliament in foreign affairs 
was described as ‘cosmetic’. Although there had been instances of censure motions 
over the conduct of Cyprus policy in the 1950s, government majorities always toed 
the line.45 The press, for its part, displayed a lively interest in foreign policy issues, 
which were often blown out of proportion in the highly polarised conditions of the 
early post-war decades. It has already been noted that questions of foreign policy have 
often led institutions, including the Church and the military, to act as pressure groups. 
As will be shown, interest groups, professional or otherwise, were habitually involved 
in mobilisation efforts on account of so-called ‘national issues’. The question is 
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whether such manifestations were expressions of a, however deficient, civil society or 
were engineered by the omnipresent state apparatus. 
To be sure, interest groups were never accorded anything like an institutional role in 
foreign policy-making. Whatever influence they exerted was bound to be indirect, 
through informal contacts and personal relations or through the press. Lawyers, 
journalists and retired officials, who usually manned the staffs of politicians, served as 
intermediaries. In cases like the GSEE or the Church, close association with the state 
machinery offset their lack of representative credentials or organisational capacity. 
These groups could then function as a two way transmission belt between public 
opinion and government. Once set in motion, however, this mechanism tended to 
develop a momentum of its own. 
One more factor needs to be considered. In the three cases examined below, 
government and pressure groups alike attempted to draw support from the large Greek 
Diaspora communities, particularly that in the United States. Indeed, this period 
witnessed the origins of the Greek-American lobby. Its task was to enlighten 
American opinion on Greek national interests and to facilitate access to US policy-
making centres. There were also sporadic attempts by individual Greek-Americans to 
offer their good offices, as in the case of the film industry magnate Spyros Skouras 
during the Cyprus controversy in the 1950s. Others, like businessman Tom Papas, 
played a more controversial role in Greek domestic politics. It is unclear, however, 
whether this community tried to influence Greek decision-making on foreign affairs. 
If it ever did so, the impact was imperceptible.46 
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Interest Groups and the Post-war Irredentist Revival 
a. The Greek National Claims, 1945-46 
As has been noted, Greek irredentism was far from dead and buried in the aftermath 
of disaster in Asia Minor. While banished from the realm of practical politics, it 
remained a powerful underlying factor. It took another World War to trigger its 
resurgence. In 1945 a consensus cut clean across the civil war divide, to the effect that 
her gallant war record and suffering under enemy occupation entitled Greece to a 
new, perhaps the final, bout of national restitution. Irredenta were not limited to the 
Dodecanese Islands, Northern Epirus and Cyprus – all three being areas with compact 
Greek populations. The Communist Party advanced claims on Turkish Thrace while 
its ‘nationalist’ opponents clamoured for territorial acquisitions to the north.47 Both 
sides tried to outbid each other in patriotic fervour. 
After the December fighting and the Varkiza agreement, the communist Left was 
increasingly isolated, its supporters persecuted and its activities penalised. Opting for 
abstention from the general elections in 1946 and for armed struggle later on, it 
forfeited any chance of participating in mainstream politics. The result was that the 
Communist Party and its affiliated organisations were barred from public life. Thus, 
from an early stage, the irredentist discourse was effectively monopolised by the 
forces of the incipient ethnikophrosyne. 
Following the Varkiza agreement, irredentist groups of more or less clear right-wing 
leanings proliferated. They were soon joined in their campaign by a host of other 
groups, from established professional associations to explicitly anti-Communist and 
royalist organisations. Thessaloniki became the centre of their campaign and with 
good cause. The city was situated near the vulnerable northern frontier, the extension 
of which these groups claimed. There was a strong element originating from various 
Greek communities in adjacent Balkan countries, with a record of organisation and 
strong connections with local patrons and politicians.48 Soon, these groups would 
compete for public attention and scant government funds. 
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Among the earliest organisations was the Committee of Unredeemed of Northern 
Greece which appeared in Thessaloniki, in February 1945. It was headed by professor 
Pericles Vyzoukides and Aristoteles Matlis, a local patron of the right-wing People’s 
Party. Matlis was also in contact with Philippos Dragoumis, at the time Under-
Secretary for Foreign Affairs.49 The Committee claimed to represent not only ‘all 
those who were at times forcibly expatriated from their, since the remotest antiquity 
Hellenic, ancestral hearths’ in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria but also an unspecified 
number still living under alien rule.50 The aim of this group was to co-ordinate private 
enlightenment efforts at home and abroad. The same task but in a more scholarly 
fashion was to be served by a Committee of National Publications which appeared in 
Athens, in March 1945, under professor Antonios Keramopoulos, a distinguished 
archeologist. It appealed to Greek academics to contribute scholarly expositions of 
Greek ‘national rights’.51 
The end of the war in autumn was greeted by a flow of declarations from various 
groups expatiating upon Greek territorial and reparation claims. They were signed by 
representatives of universities, cultural institutions, professional associations, the 
Chambers, farmers’ co-operatives, and ‘national’ labour unions. They were 
distributed to government services, politicians, and foreign legations, particularly 
those of the three leading Western Powers.52 Approaches to foreign diplomats were 
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undertaken by individuals representing organised interests. They invariably presented 
Greek claims as an ‘act of elementary justice’.53 
‘Irredenta unionism’ was apparently monopolised by a relatively limited number of 
people of considerable social standing and political connections. Certain individuals 
appear in more than one groups. Professor Keramopoulos, for instance, headed the 
Committee for National Publications, the Athens executive committee of the 
Committee for the Vindication of National Rights, in 1945, and the National Union of 
Northern Greeks: Epirotans-Thracians-Macedonians and was a member of Free 
Northern Greece, in the following year. 
The campaign momentarily assumed a mass character with the convening of a 
Panhellenic Congress of National Rights in Thessaloniki, in autumn 1945. 
Preparations had begun as early as March 1945. A Committee for the Vindication of 
National Rights was eventually formed with two sections, in Athens and Thessaloniki 
respectively, and branches in each of the nine geographical regions of Greece. The 
event was designed to coincide with the 33rd anniversary of the liberation of 
Thessaloniki. It was a national pageant complete with a Te Deum mass, parades, band 
playing, folk dancing, torch procession and speeches. The Congress proceedings 
opened by Metropolitan Gennadios. It was attended by academics, bishops, local 
government officials and a motley crowd representing anything from labour, veteran 
and war victims associations to obscure groups under ingenious labels such as the 
‘Union for the Protection of Anglo-American Interests’, the ‘Association for 
Combating Blasphemy of the Divine’ and ‘Swords of the Byzantines’.54 
Addressing ‘the Arbiters of the fortunes of the World’ from Thessaloniki – ‘ the eye, 
heart, lung and kidney of the Hellenic body’ – the Congress considered the 
vindication of Greek claims certain, if only ‘Justice and Truth’ prevailed over ‘Power 
and Fraud’. Greece, it reaffirmed, was not ‘matter’ but ‘Spirit’, thus destined to live 
eternally.55 Its concluding resolution stressed the Greek contribution to the allied war 
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effort as well as security and economic considerations in order to claim Northern 
Epirus, Northern Macedonia, Eastern Rumelia, the Dodecanese, war reparations from 
Germany, Italy, Bulgaria and Albania, and access to natural resources in neighbouring 
countries. With respect to Cyprus, it expressed confidence that Great Britain would 
repeat the Ionian precedent.56 
The campaign was given wide publicity in the press and publicly praised by 
politicians. Official endorsement was crucial for the continuation of the campaign in 
conditions of undeclared civil war. The impeccable nationalist credentials of its 
leading figures made it impossible for like-minded government officials to repudiate 
their activities. These activities, however, did cause discomfort among circles 
responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. As early as May 1945, Alexis Kyrou, 
then head of the Research and Information Directorate at the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, officially complained about the futile prominence of ‘tens, if not hundreds’ of 
organisations, associations and societies dedicated to the ‘defence of our national 
rights’. Their heavily sentimental and romantic approach, he cautioned, was likely to 
stand in the way of a cool-headed projection of postwar claims. Kyrou lamented that 
in conditions of absolute freedom of the press ‘hyperbole and outbidding in ultra-
nationalist spirit’ could not be easily restrained. As a remedy he recommended the 
formation of a high level council excluding the Left which should work out the proper 
framework for national claims.57 Indeed, a Foreign Affairs Committee was set up in 
May 1945. It was a consultative body consisting of former prime ministers, foreign 
ministers and deputy foreign ministers. Its task was to contribute to the formulation of 
Greek claims before the Peace Conference.58 
Eventually, in the absence of serious official discouragement, irredentist groups did 
claim a role in projecting the Greek case in Paris and elsewhere. As early as July 
1945, the Committee of Unredeemed of Northern Greece dispatched Panteleimon, 
Metropolitan of Argyrokastron, to the United States in order to solicit support from 
Greek Americans. In Paris, the ‘already inflated’ Greek delegation to the Peace 
Conference was joined by a crowd of ‘non-competent and non-responsible’ persons 
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who, according to Under-Secretary Dragoumis, only confused and obstructed the 
delegation’s task. Only after the conclusion of the Peace Conference did Dragoumis 
openly denounce the ‘self-appointed’ solicitors of the national cause, who resided in 
Paris thanks to ‘public funds and national decency’.59 The latter retorted that their 
services had not been adequately availed of.60 It seems unlikely, however, that their 
lengthy and verbose ‘memoranda’ would have served the Greek effort at all. The 
results of the Peace Conference, which adjudicated Greece the Dodecanese and 
limited reparations from Italy and Bulgaria, were received as a grave disappointment 
of national aspirations. Most irredentist initiatives did not survive this gloomy 
outcome, which coincided with the rekindling of the civil war. A significant exception 
was the Northern Epirus lobby which continued its rather low key activities with a 
strong backing from state sources, the Church and Greek-American communities.61 
 
b. The First Cyprus Campaign, 1950-58 
Within a few years of the Paris Peace Conference irredentism staged an impressive 
come-back under the banner of Enosis. For nearly a decade, the union of Cyprus with 
the mother country became the rallying cry of the most serious irredentist campaign in 
post-war Greece. The initiative came from the Cypriots themselves, the Cyprus 
Ethnarchy in particular, who found a powerful sponsor in the Church of Greece.62 As 
early as June 1950, a Panhellenic Committee for the Union of Cyprus (PEEK, later 
PEAK, when ‘Self-determination’ replaced ‘Enosis’) was set up in Athens under 
Archbishop Spyridon. Before long, similar committees sprang up in almost every 
district (nomos) of the country. They were typically headed by the local bishop and 
included the mayor and representatives of professional and other legally constituted 
associations, the local ‘brotherhood’ of Cypriot expatriates as well as the Boy Scouts 
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and the Girl Guides. Para-ecclesiastical organisations also played their part.63 The 
‘loyalist’, state-funded labour unions under Fotis Makris were also enthusiastic 
supporters. Significantly, political parties and party youths were not represented on 
Cyprus committees which also guarded against leftist inroads. 
Working closely with the Greek Cypriot lobby in Athens,64 PEEK tried to mobilise 
public opinion behind the cause of Enosis and put pressure on Greek governments to 
take the matter to the United Nations. After 1954, when the conservative Greek Rally 
government adopted the course of internationalisation, the domestic campaign was 
intended to demonstrate the unswerving commitment of the nation to Enosis. 
Whenever the occasion demanded, PEEK and its local committees produced a barrage 
of resolutions, petitioned foreign embassies, held symbolic strikes and mass meetings. 
In the pattern of the 1945-46 campaign, ‘prominent’ individuals and institutions, such 
as universities or the Athens Academy, undertook to assist official policy in 
‘enlightening’ world opinion on the Greek case. Pamphlets and other material was 
mailed to tens of thousands of recipients and various missions were dispatched 
abroad. The United States with its large and active Greek American community 
remained the preferred destination of these efforts.65 They also engaged in fund 
raising for financing their own activities and the struggle in Cyprus.66 
Throughout this period, state authorities remained helpful, except when the safety of 
Anglo-American interests was at stake. Perhaps more than it had been the case in 
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1945-46, the intimate relationship between the political Right and the leaders of the 
Enosis movement, the Church and the ‘official’ trade unions in particular, made it 
inexpedient for the Papagos and Karamanlis governments to try and disavow the 
campaign. Universities and schools were permitted to suspend classes in order to 
ensure the success of mass meetings for which the police had given permission. The 
press offered wide publicity and whole-hearted support to these activities. Political 
parties generally appeared happy to leave the initiative to the Church and the various 
non-political groups. EDA, the party of the communist Left, admitted that it lacked 
the organisational capacity to take the initiative. Nonetheless, it tried to outbid its 
rivals in nationalist fervour and encouraged its members to participate and try to plant 
anti-Western slogans in mass events.67 
The rhetoric and literature of the Enosis campaign confirmed the tenacity of a political 
culture that appeared to defy the bitter historical experience of three decades. 
Nationalism was hardly the hallmark of political discourse among Greece’s Western 
partners. Yet the myths and ideological constructs of 19th century Greek culture 
looked alive and well. The leading role of ecclesiastics seemed to reaffirm the 
identification between Orthodoxy and Nation. Launching the campaign in 1950, 
Archbishop Spyridon declared that the union of Cyprus with the mother country was 
an incontestable right of the Greek people and called upon all Greeks to ‘complete the 
liberation and strengthen the independence of Hellenism’.68 
The ‘historic mission’ of Hellenism was a common theme, occasionally 
complemented with references to divine election. Racial determinism was very much 
in evidence in the rhetoric of public speakers, the press, even in cartoons scornful of 
the granting of liberty to ‘coloured’, ‘spiritually inferior’ or ‘semi-civilised’ peoples – 
at a time when the ‘white’ Cypriots, descendants of those who fathered the greatest 
human civilisation, were still under colonial yoke. Significantly, Greek Cypriot 
                                                                                                                                            
front in Greece inadequate. Gerasimos I. Konidaris, «Ιστορικαί αναµνήσεις από την προετοιµασίαν του 
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68. Stefanidis, p. 259. 
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intellectuals and the Ethnarchy appeared to share such stereotypes.69 From late 1954, 
when the opposition of most Western countries to Enosis became painfully apparent, 
‘underdog’ mentality broke loose. The myth of the martyred people, constantly 
victimised by the ‘powerful of the earth’, was played up as the Cyprus campaign 
assumed a bitterly anti-Western tone.70 More than once Prime Minister Karamanlis 
pointed to a sense of isolation taking hold of people’s minds. Speaking on a national 
anniversary, he himself attributed the lack of solidarity on the part of Greece’s allies 
to the ‘fact’ that Greece did not belong to any racial group.71 
Much more than the initiatives related to post-war national claims, the Cyprus 
campaign assumed proportions of a genuine popular movement. Government attempts 
to control or even defuse it were only partially successful. When demonstrations could 
not be averted, the government sought to tighten security measures. Police brutality 
then offered the opposition and its press an opportunity to denounce the government. 
This was a source of discomfort for the self-proclaimed and generally ‘loyalist’ 
leaders of the campaign, not least the Orthodox prelates. A social group which 
apparently had something to gain from the fray were the students. Their intense 
involvement in the campaign taught them the benefits of organised action and led to 
the formation of the first student unions. In effect, an irredentist cause triggered a 
process of relative emancipation for students and urban youth in general from the 
regimented conditions of the post-civil war period. 
The Cyprus campaign was ultimately a failure. It ended with a compromise which set 
up an independent republic under tripartite tutelage and explicitly excluded Enosis in 
perpetuity.72 This outcome did not permit its domestic champions to reap any fruits of 
victory. Rather, nine years of irredentist agitation had encouraged opinion leaders 
                                                 
69. In a pamphlet on the ‘national character of Cypriot literature’, ‘race’ is a key concept. It comes up 
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Thessaloniki, 1950-1958’, unpublished paper presented at the Centre for the History of Thessaloniki, 
29 November 2000. 
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among the press, interest groups and opposition parties to outbid each other in 
intransigent, maximalist rhetoric. Greek foreign policy and, to a considerable extent, 
domestic politics came to be dominated by the Cyprus issue. Doubts were raised 
about the pro-Western orientation of the country even among supporters of the ruling 
party.73 Dissidents were ignored or intimidated.74 At some point, following the 
announcement of the Macmillan plan,75 Karamanlis felt compelled to allude publicly 
to a reappraisal of foreign policy. Under such circumstances, any room for diplomatic 
manoeuvre was severely reduced. Following a series of ‘missed opportunities’, the 
Zurich - London compromise came too late to salvage much of the original Greek 
objectives. 
 
c. The Second Cyprus Campaign, 1963-67 
Within three years of independence communal politics in Cyprus reached deadlock. In 
late 1963, President Makarios attempted to have the power-sharing safeguards for the 
Turkish Cypriot community curtailed. The fact was that the nationalist leadership of 
either ethnic group tended to treat the young Republic as little more than a temporary 
expedient; neither abandoned their long-cherished objectives, Enosis and partition 
respectively. Communal violence broke out, threatening to draw in Greece and 
Turkey and dislocate NATO’s southern flank. 
At the time Greece was passing through a period of transition from eleven years of 
high handed conservative rule to the more liberal administration of the Centre Union 
under George Papandreou. Facing two successive elections in late 1963 and early 
                                                                                                                                            
Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955-59, Minnesota Mediterranean and East European 
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73. Speaking as chairman of the Panhellenic Committee for the Self-determination of Cyprus, 
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74. Among them, Philippos Dragoumis, whose criticism of Enosis agitation and the policy of 
internationalisation would not be published even by conservative newspapers. Eventually, he issued a 
pamphlet, titled On the Cyprus Issue, which cost him much abuse. Dragoumis Papers, files 113 and 
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condominium and, ultimately, partition in Cyprus. 
 28
Interest Groups and Greek Foreign Policy, 1945-67 
1964, Greek leaders were at first inclined to urge a course of moderation and 
reconciliation on the Greek Cypriots. Before long, however, they were faced with a 
powerful revival of pro-Enosis and anti-Western sentiment at home and President 
Makarios’ increasingly independent course in Cyprus.76 
The initiative, it seems, came from the societies of Greek Cypriot students in Athens 
and Thessaloniki. Together with national student unions began holding mass meetings 
and issuing resolutions. Before long, the usual array of organised interests and 
institutions joined in. They invariably urged the government to denounce the Zurich-
London accords and support the Greek Cypriots’ bid for self-determination.77 While 
the Holy Synod gave its blessing and clerics were still at the lead of marches, this time 
the driver’s seat was not reserved for the Church. The effort was much more diffuse. 
Although PEAK was revived under retired General Notis Botsaris, it played none of 
its past role. Moreover, the Left was now able to make its presence felt through its 
own Committee for Cypriot Self-determination.78. The party of EDA and its youth 
organisations were better organised, more numerous and stood to benefit from the 
relaxation of the security regime under the Centre government. 
Once again exalted irredentist rhetoric was very much in display, complete with 
expressions of chauvinism and stereotypes oozing cultural determinism.79 This time, 
however, there were two novel elements in comparison with the 1950s campaign. 
Government officials, from Prime Minister Papandreou down to prefects and 
education inspectors, did not hesitate to adopt a staunchly nationalistic posture 
publicly, in contrast with the reserved manners of the Karamanlis administration. 
Receiving a petition on Cyprus, the Speaker of Parliament claimed to ‘serve History 
                                                 
76. The diplomatic history of the period see in Sotiris Rizas, Ένωση, διχοτόµηση, ανεξαρτησία: Οι 
Ηνωµένες Πολιτείες και η Βρετανία στην αναζήτηση λύσης για το Κυπριακό,, 1963-1967, Βιβλιόραµα, 
2000. 
77. Eleutheria, 28-29 Dec. 1963, 16 Jan. 1964. 
78. Archives of Contemporary Social History, EDA Records, file 479, communiqué of the Committee 
of co-operating scientific, cultural, labour, student et al. organisations for the self-determination of 
Cyprus, 10 May 64. Eleutheria, 28 Aug. 1964. 
79. A resolution issued by the Greek Women Intellectuals considered it ‘unthinkable that in the 
twentieth century, while semi-developed peoples acquire their liberty’, the rights of the people of Greek 
Cyprus are suppressed. Eleutheria, 12 Feb. 1964. Addressing a student meeting, the Rector of the 
Athens University declared that ‘the Turks may not live among civilised peoples, because they are 
distinguished by stout spiritual non-existence’. Ibid., 11 Aug. 1964. Speaking in Thessaloniki later that 
year, Prime Minister Papandreou stirred his student audience to rapture, when he declared that, 
following the impending Enosis, ‘Cyprus is destined to continue with peaceful means the march of 
Alexander the Great to the East’. Ibid., 28 Oct. 1964. 
 29
Ioannis D. Stefanidis  
and the Nation’ by declaring that the entire Greek people ‘throbbed with desire for 
Enosis’.80 In early March 1964, Papandreou sanctioned the unfettered expression of 
popular feeling for ‘the just struggle of Cypriot Hellenism’, with which, he declared, 
his government was ‘in full psychic harmony’. Only after demonstrations turned 
violently anti-American and diplomatically embarrassing, did the government seek 
publicly to discourage them.81 This was a second point of departure from the 1950s 
experience, since anti-Western manifestations were now combined with a display of 
neutralist and pro-Soviet feeling. 
From the outset, the reluctance of the Western allies to satisfy Greek claims on 
Cyprus appeared to incense public opinion. The prospect of NATO involvement was 
rejected and the American mediation efforts under former Secretary of State Dean 
Acheson were construed as part of a sinister plot to deprive the Greek Cypriots of 
their right to self-determination and clear the way to partition. As has been noted, 
neutralist and, to a lesser extent, pro-Soviet manifestations were very much in 
evidence. This was not merely the result of leftist influence, however substantial that 
was. Traditional anti-Western feeling combined with the attributes of ‘underdog’ 
mentality to produce a heady blend. The trend reached its peak during the summer 
crisis, when the government of President Makarios received substantial Soviet 
backing in the face of Turkish threats. A growing body of opinion now perceived 
United States and NATO policies to be detrimental to national interests. When, in 
early 1965, the new leaders in the Kremlin switched in favour of a federal solution to 
the Cyprus question, pro-Soviet sentiment died down, contributing to a defensive 
mood and a growing sense of isolation. 
The Cyprus campaign gradually petered out following the summer crisis and UN 
mediation. The rejection of the Acheson plan and the infiltration of Greek troops into 
the island apparently were in line with public sentiment. The last mass meeting took 
place in January 1965.82 Public interest was soon monopolised by the acute political 
crisis in which the country became enmeshed in the summer of that year. Declarations 
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in favour of self-determination and Enosis were still reported, not least by President 
Makarios, mostly on some national occasion.83 
Some further stirrings were observed in early 1967, when Greek-Turkish contacts 
failed to achieve a breakthrough and Ankara appeared to harden its position. A 
National Committee of Cypriot Struggle was set up in Athens. It was remarkable in 
that its members represented a wide spectrum of political affiliations, from the 
extreme Right to members of EDA.84 The Committee declared Enosis to be the only 
nationally admissible objective and expressed support for Makarios’ policy of non-
alignment. It also demanded the immediate suspension of the ‘infamous’ Greek-
Turkish dialogue, a position shared by Andreas Papandreou, the up and coming leader 
of the Greek Centre-Left.85 The advent of the military dictatorship in April 1967 
would bring these stirrings to an abrupt end. 
For the third time in two decades popular mobilisation did not fail to raise the stakes 
for policy-makers. To the extent that it contributed to the decision of the Papandreou 
government to reject a compromise as advocated by Greece’s Western allies and to 
insist on the course of internationalisation, the activities of the various groups 
mobilised in 1964 were probably more successful than those in the two previous 
instances. Their impact was apparently enhanced by the obvious populist reflexes of 
Papandreou and certain members of his cabinet. It is now clear that his entourage, 
including Andreas Papandreou, and President Makarios were instrumental in 
convincing the aging Prime Minister that the compromise plans on offer went against 
the real interests of Greece and Cyprus.86 In underestimating the risks involved, 
official considerations and popular sentiment were for once in harmony. 
 
                                                 
83. ‘ “Enosis and only Enosis” declared Makarios’, Eleutheria, 9 Nov. 1966. 
84. The Committee was chaired by Professor Dimitrios Vezanis, once an apologist  of General 
Metaxas’ authoritarian regime, later a member of the Struggle Committee which assisted Colonel 
Grivas in organising his armed campaign in Cyprus. Present were moderate figures, such as the 
economist Hryssos Evelpidis and Alexandros Sakellaropoulos, chairman of the Athens Bar 
Association, as well as Komninos Pyromaglou, former EDA deputy, and Kostas Hatziargyris, a 
distinguished journalist of the EDA daily organ. 
85. EDA Records, file 479, National Committee of Cypriot Struggle, pamphlet dated 23 Jan. 1967. For 
Andreas Papandreou’s views, see his statement to the press in Eleutheria, 3 Feb. 1967. 
86. Rizas, 157-160. 
 31
Ioannis D. Stefanidis  
A Comparative Perspective: Pressure Groups and Foreign Policy in West 
Germany and Israel 
After World War II, interest groups were involved in matters of foreign policy in 
several Western countries. The ‘Suez group’ of the mid-1950s in Britain comes to 
mind. At first sight, however, two particular cases present some analogies to Greece: 
in West Germany and Israel interest groups perceived a stake in their country’s 
foreign policy and attempted to influence it accordingly. Social, political and 
ideological factors were at play group but their interaction with state policy varied 
considerably. 
Not unlike Greece in the aftermath of the Asia Minor catastrophe, post-war West 
Germany faced an acute social and ideological crisis. Apart from the effects of war on 
its soil, the country played host to nearly nine million persons expelled from eastern 
German territories lost and other parts of Central and Eastern Europe. It also received 
an influx of refugees from East Germany. By the late 1950s these two elements 
comprised almost one quarter of the population. Predictably, various associations 
sprang up claiming to represent their interests. Their activities were not limited to 
keeping the memory of the ancestral lands alive and to pressing for economic and 
social rehabilitation. They also attempted to influence the foreign policy of the federal 
government. Irredentism, however, was out of the question. Although such tendencies 
existed, the experience of Nazi terror and defeat had utterly discredited the pre-war 
German nationalism and militarism. A new, liberal political culture was gradually 
built up and, for the first time in German history, civil society had its chance. This 
ideological watershed did much to marginalise irredentist dreams. 
Expellee and refugee organisations lobbied Bonn against recognition of Germany’s 
eastern border with Poland and assumption of full diplomatic relations with 
Czechoslovakia prior to a settlement of their property claims in those countries.87 In 
1950 some of these groups came together to form a political party, the Bloc of 
Expellees and Disenfranchised (BHE), which enjoyed a short-lived success in 
regional and the 1953 federal elections. Before long, however, the party lost its 
appeal. This was primarily the result of the country’s economic miracle and the 
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successful rehabilitation policy of the Adenauer government,88 Expellee and refugee 
associations continued to try and influence German policy towards the East through 
their connections with the Christian Democratic Union, in particular, and their 
contacts in the Foreign Ministry. By 1970, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik cut the ground 
from under their feet.89 More than its predecessors, the Social Democratic leadership 
felt confident enough to ignore the pressure tactics of a group which was evidently out 
of step with the prevailing public mood. 
Israel may prima facie present better analogies with post-war Greece. During the 
same period, the two states faced acute external problems and were involved in 
irredentist projects. They were both highly centralised states imbued with strong 
nationalist ideologies. But such analogies can be misleading. Israel was still going 
through a process of state building, whereas the territorial consolidation of Greece had 
all but been completed in 1923. Israel faced intermittent fighting, whereas Greece, 
entrenched within the Western Alliance, stirred clear of armed conflict. Moreover, 
Israel enjoyed a much more consolidated, inclusive political system – except, of 
course, in the case of its disenfranchised Arab population – which tended to 
accommodate interests and discourage confrontation.90 Greece’s political system, on 
the other hand, proved far from solid and representation of interests was either 
controlled or excluded. 
Three institutional groups play a key role in Israeli foreign policy to this date: the 
military and defence establishment, the civil bureaucracy of the Foreign and Defence 
Ministries and the Jewish Diaspora, particularly in the United States. In a state 
constantly faced with acute security dilemmas, the military was naturally in position 
to influence foreign policy-making. It advocated high levels of preparedness and the 
use of force as the best instruments of policy. It has also been described as a 
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‘permanent arms lobby’. Military views often clashed with the more accommodation-
oriented attitude of the Foreign Ministry staff. Finally, the Jewish lobby in the United 
States has long proved a valuable source of support for the state of Israel. As a rule, 
the Jewish-American organisations urged a more conciliatory policy towards the 
Arabs and upon occasion, e.g. during the Suez crisis of 1956, tried to restrain Israeli 
aggression. Their impact on Israeli foreign policy, however, has been assessed as 
‘marginal’. 
Whereas in Greece the role of clientelistic networks and personal connections was 
paramount, interest politics in Israel were dominated by the all pervading influence of 
political parties.91 Associational interest groups that mattered were the General 
Labour Federation (Histadrut), the members of the collective farms (kibbutzim) and, 
increasingly, the groups representing the minority of Sephardic (mostly non-
European) Jews. Histadrut was a source of support for the Labour Party which 
dominated Israeli politics well into the 1970s. The kibbutzim played an active role as 
supporters of settlement and security policies. Non-associational groups were both 
active and divided. In times of crisis, as in May 1967, academics, intellectuals and the 
media helped to generate considerable public pressure in favour of a pre-emptive 
strike against neighbouring Arab states. After the war, these elements joined the Land 
of Israel Movement, which advocated the retention of all occupied territories. Only a 
small minority had consistently preached accommodation with the Arab neighbours.92 
Public pressures for a change of policy would become more pronounced and effective 
after the Yom Kippur war in 1973. 
Not unlike Greek irredentism, Israeli expansionism was grounded on ‘historical 
claims’. Still, the Labour leadership of David Ben-Gurion and his successors proved 
able to abandon historic land, ‘when a historical claim confronted the state interest’.93 
This was the case after the 1956 war and, later, in the 1970s, at the time of the Camp 
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David accords. To a far greater extent than their Greek counterparts, Israeli policy-
makers sought ‘to mobilize public opinion in support of policies adopted, rather than 
looking to public opinion for guidance’.94 The strength of the party system, its ability 
to mobilise public opinion behind government options in particular, was one reason. 
A more flexible political culture, in the sense that it stressed civil values as much as 
nationalist tenets, was also a factor that was absent in the Greek case. Like in West 
Germany, the degree of openness and consolidation of political institutions enabled 
the ruling élites to eschew the lure of nationalist overbidding and to adopt policies 
more commensurate to the external challenges and the domestic capabilities of their 
country. 
 
Epilogue 
Throughout the early post-war period, Greece remained a militarily vulnerable state 
which lagged behind the economic, social and political standards of its Western 
partners. Security, economic development and political modernisation were the tasks 
facing those in office. Their efficacy, however, was undermined by both material and 
cultural constraints. Among the latter, the strong irredentist undercurrent of the 
dominant culture threatened to disrupt the country’s external relations, undermine 
political stability and distract successive governments from their urgent tasks. 
The ‘national claims’ agitation and the Enosis campaign of the 1950s reflected little 
concern, if any, for the immediate problems facing the Greek state and society. They 
flourished in default of civil society. While claiming to represent ‘society’, their 
leaders usually identified themselves with the conservative, ‘national minded’ élites 
which controlled the state throughout this period. Clearly, the groups which took the 
initiative in mobilising the public needed little official encouragement. The traditions 
of the nation showed them the way. For irredentist societies after the war, it was an 
opportunity to gain national status and bolster their political influence. Many of their 
members were active in local networks of political patronage. A few years later, 
Enosis offered the Church of Greece a chance to reassert its role as the ‘Ark of 
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Hellenism’ –an ideological construct of the post-liberation period.95 The same issue 
provided the ‘official’ trade-unionism with a worthy cause, which Makris, its 
unscrupulous leader, relished to the extent of calling occasional industrial action. 
Participation in the ‘national struggle’ was considered a duty by most organised 
sections of society. It further conferred respectability and occasional legitimacy to 
groups otherwise excluded from the political mainstream. This was the case of the 
student groups, unions outside the GSEE and the other organisations of the Left. 
Political patronage and a common ideological outlook further ensured that these 
activities were tolerated, when not abetted, by the state authorities. They fitted in with 
a generally intolerant political culture in so far they did not challenge the post-civil 
war social and political order. They might even help to defuse social pressures from 
‘below’: against the grim social, political and economic background of the 1940s and 
1950s, these recurrent outbursts of irredentism constituted a display of escapism on a 
mass scale.96 By the time of the second Cyprus campaign, however, nationalism had 
blended with demands for social and political change and a more independent 
international role for Greece. It was this mixture of traditional political culture and the 
material aspirations of hitherto excluded social strata that would fuel the populist 
ascendancy of the 1970s and 1980s. 
To the extent that political élites are answerable to a domestic constituency, it is 
reasonable to expect that their options in foreign affairs will be restrained by 
expectations stemming from particular interests as well as the prevailing political 
culture. As a result, actual decisions often diverge from the rational-choice model, 
which stipulates that actors choose policies that promise to maximize benefits and 
minimize losses.97 This was clearly the case of Greek foreign policy during the period 
discussed here. Irrespective of official endorsement, group mobilisation on foreign 
policy issues proved a double-edged instrument. It could help defuse social tensions; 
it could confer legitimacy on government policies; it might even assist those in office 
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in holding out against foreign pressures. But it also raised the stakes in terms of 
domestic political ‘cost’ and thus reduced the range of politically acceptable options. 
It encouraged inflexibility and maximalism, often against the better judgement of 
policy-makers. Ultimately, the government ought to take decisions. In doing so it 
could disregard the opposition parties but not its own constituency. A series of set-
backs and ‘missed opportunities’ was almost invariably the outcome. 
The dashing of the irredentist dreams rekindled during the period, combined with the 
experience of the seven-year military rule, might lead one to anticipate a thorough 
reappraisal of the nationalist core of Greek political culture. This was not to be. 
Irredentism may be all but extinct but the defensive, xenophobic and anti-Western 
version of Greek nationalism is still very much in evidence. Nor was the scope for 
making political capital out of foreign policy issues limited, as the Macedonian 
controversy of the 1990s proved. That Greek foreign policy still has to be relieved of 
its heavy domestic nexus, cultural and political, must be a failure of both the state and 
society. 
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